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Abstract
WTO negotiations rely on tari® reduction formulas. It has been
argued that formula approaches are of increasing importance in
trade talks, because of the large number of countries involved, the
wider dispersion in initial tari®s (e.g. tari® peaks) and gaps between
bound and applied tari® rates. This paper presents a two country
intra-industry trade model with heterogeneous ¯rms subject to high
and low tari®s. We examine the welfare e®ects of applying three
di®erent tari® reduction formulas proposed in the literature i) a
proportional cut, ii) the Swiss formula and iii) a compression formula.
No single formula dominates for all conditions. The ranking of the
three tools depends on the degree of product di®erentiation in the
industry, and the achieved reduction in the average tari®.
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11 Introduction
WTO negotiations aim to reduce overall tari® levels and to increase market
access. A longstanding policy objective of these negotiations has been to en-
sure a balanced exchange of concessions and a greater reduction of high tari®
barriers than lower barriers, thus reducing the dispersion of tari®s. Tari® re-
duction formulas have been one of the main tools for achieving these goals.
A formula means literally a simple mathematical rule for the conversion of
pre-negotiation tari®s into new post-negotiation tari®s. The idea is that,
given a broadly accepted formula for reducing trade restrictions in various
sectors, the commitment of the countries involved in the negotiations can
better be determined. Moreover, the likelihood of success increases with for-
mula approaches compared to the situation with discretion in determining
the protection level in di®erent sectors and for di®erent products (Francois
and Martin (2003)). It has been argued that formula approaches will be
needed even more in current and future negotiations in order to secure suc-
cess, because of the large number of countries involved in the negotiations,
the wider dispersion in initial tari®s (e.g. tari® peaks) and the gaps between
bound and applied tari® rates.
Di®erent formulas have been proposed in di®erent GATT/WTO negotia-
tion rounds. The literature has described and analyzed the various formulas
and their characteristics (see e.g. Francois and Martin (2003) and Laird et
al. (2003)). However, thus far the e®ects of these formulas have not been
examined within the framework of an international trade model. On the
other hand, international trade theory and intra-industry trade models in
particular have thoroughly analyzed the welfare e®ects of reducing tari®s
and comparing di®erent types of tari®s and other forms of trade barriers
such as quotas, real trade costs, technical barriers etc., see e.g. Gros (1987),
Markusen and Venables (1988), Helpman and Krugman (1989), Lockwood
and Wong (2000), and J¿rgensen and SchrÄ oder (2005), but never directly
connected to a formula approach. However, Kowalczyk (2002) analyzes tari®
reforms in an international trade model. The analysis is not directly con-
nected to the formula approaches discussed here, but looks at the reform of
ad valorem tari®s and subsidies and applies a set-up di®erent from ours.
The present paper examines the welfare e®ects of using di®erent formu-
las to achieve a given reduction in the average tari®. We build a simple
intra-industry trade model and use numerical simulations to show the wel-
fare rankings of di®erent tari® reduction formulas. The proposed model is
a symmetric two-county Krugman-type (1980) intra-industry trade model,
with ¯rm level heterogeneous ¯xed costs of exporting as in Schmitt and Yu
(2001). In this model, not all ¯rms trade in equilibrium. Furthermore, we in-
2troduce two tari® levels, i.e. products with high and low tari®s. This enables
us to examine di®erent scenarios for the initial tari® dispersion, such as tari®
peaks. In this model, the entry, exit and scale decisions of ¯rms regarding
both home market and exporting activities depend on the initial tari® struc-
ture, the degree of trade liberalization, the degree of product di®erentiation
in the industry, and the tari® reduction formula applied. We analyze three
di®erent formulas that have been proposed in various GATT/WTO negoti-
ation rounds to govern a reduction in the average tari®. We examine i) the
proportional cut formula used in the Kennedy Round, ii) the Swiss formula,
which was accepted in the Tokyo Round, and ¯nally iii) the EU compres-
sion mechanism, which was proposed by the EU in the Doha Round, each
time examining the impact on welfare when liberalizing trade with a given
formula.
It is found that reductions in the trade restriction using the three formu-
las have a positive impact on welfare. We show that the ranking of the three
di®erent conversion formulas in terms of welfare depends on the degree of
trade liberalization and the degree of product di®erentiation. However, the
initial tari® structure { i.e. the initial degree of tari® dispersion/peaks { has
no qualitative in°uence on the welfare ranking of the three tools. In partic-
ular, we show that the ranking of the Swiss formula and the proportional
cut depends on the industry structure, so that for di®erentiated industries,
the Swiss formula welfare dominates the proportional cut, while for more
homogeneous industries, the proportional cut welfare dominates the Swiss
formula. This result holds for all levels of trade liberalization. The rank-
ing of the EU compression mechanism is more complex as it depends both
on the industry structure and on the level of trade liberalization. In situa-
tions with only small reductions in the average tari®, the EU compression
formula welfare dominates (is welfare dominated by) both the Swiss formula
and the proportional cut for highly di®erentiated industries (homogeneous
industries); and vise versa for large reductions in trade barriers.
The next section presents a two-country symmetric monopolistic compe-
tition intra-industry trade model with ¯rm heterogeneous ¯xed costs when
exporting. The three formula approaches are also introduced. In Section 3
we show the simulations and welfare results when liberalizing trade through
tari® reduction formulas. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The starting point of this model is the application of the Chamberlinian mo-
nopolistic competition model to international trade, developed by Krugman
3(1980). However, we allow for ¯rm heterogeneity with respect to exporting
costs as in Schmitt and Yu (2001). In particular, it is assumed that the world
consists of two symmetric countries. Firms are producing in the same indus-
try; hence, there is intra-industry trade. Market conditions are described
by monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale in production and
di®erentiated goods. The industry has a large number of potential variants,
which enter symmetrically into demand. Variants at home and abroad are
di®erent. However, not all ¯rms will trade due the the di®erences in export-
ing costs. Consumers' preferences are identical and there is a demand for
both domestic and foreign products. As the two countries are identical, we
concentrate on the speci¯cations for the home country throughout the anal-
ysis. Foreign variables are indicated by a ¤. Adopting the utility function of
Schmitt and Yu (2001) with the extension that imported goods are subject






















where 0 < µ < 1 and cd;id is consumption of variant id of non-exported
domestic products, ct;it is consumption of variant it of the exported domestic
products, cl;i¤
l is consumption of variant i¤
l of imported low-tari® products,
and ch;i¤
h is consumption of variant i¤
h of imported high-tari® products1. The
number of variants actually produced (nd, nt, nl and nh ) is assumed to be
large, although smaller than Md, Mt, Ml and Mh.
On the supply side, we assume that there exists only one factor of pro-
duction: labor. Firms can produce their speci¯c variant for the home market
alone or for both the home and foreign market. The decision to export is
a ¯rm-endogenous decision where some but not all ¯rms will export. Each
¯rm produces with the same type of cost function. However, the exporting
costs of ¯rms are heterogeneous. A cost function for a ¯rm that only sells
on the domestic market is given by l = ® + ¯xd and for a ¯rm that both
sells on the domestic market and is engaged in export activity is given by
l = ®+ai +¯(xt +xz), where l is labor used in production, xd is production
of a non-exporting ¯rm for home market, xt is production of an exporting
¯rm for the home market, and xz;z = l;h is production of an exporting ¯rm
for the foreign market depending on whether the product is subject to low
or high tari®s. To produce any di®erentiated good, labor is required to cover
¯xed costs ® and constant marginal costs ¯. Furthermore, if the ¯rm ex-
ports, then additional ¯rm-speci¯c ¯xed costs ai are incurred, which results
1Since all goods enter symmetrically and since all ¯rms behave identically within the
two categories trading and non-trading, we can omit subscript i when unnecessary.
4in heterogeneous ¯rms. Labor requirements are converted into nominal costs
by multiplying by the wage rate w.
We assume that all domestic ¯rms are born with some ¯rm-speci¯c ai
and that ai is distributed uniformly on [0;®]. F(x) = x=® is the distribution
function with F(0) = 0 and F(®) = 1. There will be two types of ¯rms:
trading and non-trading ¯rms. There will be a certain level of exporting cost
determined endogenously in the model that divides the ¯rms into trading
and non-trading ¯rms. Firms with higher exporting costs will not ¯nd it
pro¯table to export and will stay out of the foreign market. On the other
hand, ¯rms with lower exporting costs will export and make a pro¯t.
Not only do ¯rms have to incur exporting costs, they are also faced with
tari® barriers when exporting. We assume that all products are subject to
foreign ad valorem tari®s (Schmitt and Yu (2001) assume an iceberg type
of trade cost) when exported. We classify the products into two categories:
a low-tari® category and a high-tari® category, as we assume that for some
reasons some variants are facing low tari® barriers and some are facing high
tari® barriers. A proportion °, where 0 < ° < 1, of products is subject to
the high tari® ¿h, while a proportion (1 ¡ °) is subject to the low tari® ¿l.
Finally, various market clearing conditions complete the model: labor
market clearing demands that L = nd(®+¯xd)+nt(®+¯(xt+xz))+
P
ai and
similarly for the foreign country; the market clearing condition demands that
the output of each variant should be equal to its total world consumption.
Since each variant within the same type (domestic non-exporting, domestic
exporting, imported low tari® and imported high tari®) behaves identically,
we have omitted the subscripts id, it, il and ih.
2.1 Non-exporting ¯rms
To ¯nd equilibrium for a ¯rm that does not export, we follow the standard
procedure: free entry and exit; the zero-pro¯t condition ¼d = pdxd ¡ (® +
¯xd)w and labor market clearing at full employment (see e.g. Krugman,









In the special case where no ¯rms export, we can ¯nd the autarkic number
of ¯rms by using the labor resource constraint L = na(®+¯xd). The autarkic
number of ¯rms is na = L(1 ¡ µ)=®.
52.2 Exporting ¯rms
An exporting ¯rm sells xt on the domestic market and xz on the foreign
market, where z = l;h depending on whether the product is subject to low
or high tari®s. For the moment, no distinction is made between low and
high tari®s and the analysis is carried out with a general ad valorem tari®
¿z. Hence, the pro¯t of a trading ¯rm is given by
¼z = ptxt + (1 ¡ ¿z)pzxz + (® + ai + ¯xt + ¯xz) (4)
By maximizing (4) with respect to xt and xz the price decision of the ¯rm












Note that since pt = pd consumers do not distinguish between non-traded
home products and traded home products; hence, production of exporting
¯rms for their domestic market must be:




Sales on the foreign market of home ¯rms { and import sales by foreign
¯rms on the home market { however, are di®erent. Note that from (6), we
have that exported goods are more expensive than domestically produced
goods and that by symmetry pz = pz
¤, i.e. the price that a home ¯rm
charges abroad is the same as the price charged by foreign exporters on our
home market. In equilibrium, utility maximization requires that the ratio of
the marginal utility of an extra consumption unit of home exporting ¯rms'
goods for the home market and imported goods for the home market equals




pz. Using symmetry and cL = x we get
xz = xd(1 ¡ ¿z)
1
1¡µ < xt (8)
Hence, an exporting ¯rm is producing more of the variant for the home
market than for the export market but charges a higher price on the foreign
market. Thus, by symmetry, domestic consumers pay more and consume less
of the imported product varieties than of the domestically produced varieties.
Furthermore, goods that are subject to the high tari® are more expensive and
are produced on a smaller scale than goods subject to the low tari®.
6With these prices and quantities for exporting ¯rms, we can now calculate
which ¯rms will export and which ¯rms will not. Hence, we have to ¯nd the
break-even exporting ¯rm; i.e. given the heterogeneity of the ¯rms in terms of
their exporting costs, we will ¯nd the level of exporting costs ¹ ai where the ¯rm
just makes zero exporting pro¯t. Solving ¼
exp
i = (1¡¿z)pzxz¡(ai+¯xz)w = 0
for ai gives the break-even level of exporting costs:
¹ az = ®(1 ¡ ¿z)
1
1¡µ < ® (9)
All ¯rms with ai 2 [o; ¹ az] make non-negative pro¯ts from exporting and will
export, whereas ¯rms with exporting costs higher than ¹ az will choose not to
export due to negative pro¯ts from exporting. Note that an increase in the
tari® level lowers the break-even exporting costs; i.e. the least e±cient ¯rms
will cease their exporting activity in response to a tari® increase.
Finally, the distinction between high and low tari®s matters in equations
(6), (8) and (9). Inserting ¿h and ¿l, one gets price, production volume and
the break-even exporting costs for ¯rms producing products subject to high
and low tari®s respectively; in particular, notice that ¹ ah < ¹ al.
2.3 Number of ¯rms
For a full description of the equilibrium, we have to determine the number
of the various types of ¯rms: non-exporting ¯rm, exporting ¯rm subject
to high tari®s, and exporting ¯rm subject to low tari®s. To calculate the
actual numbers of ¯rms in total and in the various categories, we use the fact
that the ¯rm-speci¯c exporting costs are uniformly distributed in the interval
[0;®] with the distribution function F(x) = x=®, and that the proportion °
of products are subject to the high tari® ¿h and that the proportion 1 ¡ °
of products are subject to the low tari® ¿l. Figure 1 illustrates the issue.
Firms are evenly distributed in the rectangular area, yet subject to di®erent
¯rm-speci¯c ai's and to di®erent tari® levels. However, as shown above, their
resource use (scale) for the portion of their production that is aimed at the
home market is identical. Firms in areas C, E, and F are pure home ¯rms,
i.e. not exporting. Firms in area D export subject to the high tari®, and have
an according resource use determined by the smaller scale of the exporting
activity. Firms in areas A and B export subject to the low tari® and have a
larger exporting scale. More formally, the number of ¯rms is given by:
nd = (1 ¡ F(¹ al))N + (F(¹ al) ¡ F( ¹ ah))°N (10)
nh = F( ¹ ah)°N (11)
nl = F(¹ al)(1 ¡ °)N (12)
7where N = nd + nh + nl = nd + nt is the total number of domestic ¯rms.
Using the fact that the average exporting cost is given by ¹ al=2 and ¹ ah=2 for
goods subject to low and high tari®s respectively, the labor market clearing
condition becomes:
nd(xd¯ + ®) + nh(xt¯ + ® + xh¯ +
¹ ah
2
) + nl(xt¯ + ® + xl¯ +
¹ al
2





® ¹ al ¹ ah
A B C
D E F
Figure 1: The di®erent types of ¯rms
Inserting the above relations into the labor market clearing condition, we
get the number of exporting ¯rms subject to low and high tari®s and the
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From (16) it can easily be seen that the total number of ¯rms under
trade is less than the number of ¯rms under autarky. Yet, because of trade,
consumers also buy foreign varieties; in particular, due to symmetry, nh and
nl also give the number of foreign varieties available at the domestic market.
82.4 Protection level
For given levels of the high and low tari®s, the corresponding average tari®
level, ¹ ¿, is calculated weighted by the fraction of goods that are subject to
high and low tari®s respectively. Using the composition of home production
as weights, ¹ ¿ is simply given by:
¹ ¿ = °¿h + (1 ¡ °)¿l (17)
The starting point of our analysis of tari® reduction is ¹ ¿, as we will be
using three di®erent formulas to determine the welfare e®ects of reducing
this average tari® by a certain amount. In general, we will look at:
(1 ¡ Á)¹ ¿ = °gj(¿h) + (1 ¡ °)gj(¿l) (18)
where Á measures the desired reduction in the average tari® level { i.e. the
degree of trade liberalization { and gj(¿) represents the various tari® reduc-
tion formulas; j = P;S;C.
2.5 Formula approaches
We deal with three formulas frequently discussed in the literature (see e.g.
Francoise and Martin (2003), Laird et al (2003)). The ¯rst formula used is
one of the simplest formulas; namely the proportional cut:
gP(¿) = ½¿ ; (19)
where ½ is the constant proportion according to which the initial tari® is
reduced. This formula approach was used in the GATT Kennedy Round
(1963-67). The proportional cut formula leads to a large absolute reduction
of high tari®s. However, it does not lead to a larger proportional reduction in
higher tari®s than in lower tari®s. This con°icts with the political objective
of eliminating tari® peaks expressed in the GATT and WTO negotiations.
The second formula that we analyze is the Swiss formula. It was accepted





where s is a positive coe±cient which indicates the highest level a tari®
included in the negotiation list can take. The Swiss formula has a progressive
nature as it leads to higher reductions in higher tari®s compared to lower
tari®s, both in absolute and relative terms2. Hence, it is a tool that is in
2This is why it is also called a harmonizing approach, see Laird et al. (2003).
9line with the policy objective of the WTO for reducing tari® peaks and tari®
escalations.
The third formula that we analyze is the compression mechanism, which is











max are minimum and
maximum limits in the initial brackets, and B1
min and B1
max are minimum
and maximum limits in the new brackets. The number of brackets { or ranges
{ are subject to negotiation and so are the minimum and maximum bracket
levels. An example is shown in Laird et al. (2003). The last part of the
formula { the fraction { is the actual compression parameter that determines
the compression of the tari®s in each bracket. The formula works like the
proportional cut with a maximum ceiling on tari®s. Accordingly, it strongly
reduces tari® peaks and is, in this respect, similar to the Swiss formula. For
the purpose of this paper we simplify the compression formula to:
gC(¿) = B + (¿ ¡ ¿l)c ; (21)
where c is the compression parameter, B determines the new minimum tari®
level and ¿l is the initial minimum level of tari®s; i.e. the lower tari® in our
case.
3 Simulations and welfare results
We now have the tools to analyze the welfare e®ects of a reduction in the
protection level using di®erent formula approaches. Total utility derived from
(1) is a measure of welfare. Given the clearing conditions for the market for






Inserting the equilibrium values from above, the exact utility expression can
be derived (see Appendix A.1).
For our analysis, we assume that both countries have imposed tari®s on
imports leading to some average tari® level ¹ ¿ given in (17). The formulas
given by (19), (20) and (21) are used to achieve identical reductions in the
average tari® level measured by Á. However, the resulting utility expressions
of applying these formulas, when compared at equal reductions of the average
tari® to (A.1), do not allow for analytical solutions of welfare rankings and
we instead provide numerical simulations3.
For these simulations we need to ¯nd the connection between the liberal-
ization degree Á and the parameters in the di®erent formulas; i.e. ½, s and B
3The calculations and simulations can be obtained in a separate appendix from the
authors upon request.
10are determined endogenously in the model. From (19) it is straightforward
to see that in the case of the proportional cut, a desired reduction in the
average tari® of Á requires ½ = 1 ¡ Á. However, for the Swiss formula and
the compression formula, it is not trivial to ¯nd the connection between the
liberalization degree and the parameters s and B in equation (20) and (21)
respectively4.
The results of the simulations are shown in Figure 2. In the examples, we
have set ® = 1, ¯ = 0:5, L = 100 and the compression parameter c = 0:7. In
the ¯gure, we analyze two cases of tari® dispersions. In the left column, we
look at tari® peaks. We identify this case as a situation where only a small
fraction of the goods are subject to high tari®s but in return, the high tari®
¿h is indeed high relative to the low tari® ¿l. Speci¯cally, we set ¿h = 0:9,
¿l = 0:3 and ° = 1=6. In the right panels, however, we look at tari® plateaus;
i.e. compared to the case of peaks we have lower high tari®s but a larger
fraction of goods subject to the high tari®s. Speci¯cally, we set ¿h = 0:6,
¿l = 0:3 and ° = 1=3, leading in both situations to the initial average tari®
level of ¹ ¿ = 0:40.
Figure 2 displays the ratio of utility after and before liberalization { that
is, post-liberalization utility over pre-liberalization utility { as a function of
µ; i.e the degree of product di®erentiation in the industry. Going from the
top to the bottom, we analyze a higher degree of liberalization; i.e. higher
values of Á. Utility under the proportional cut is plotted with a solid line;
the curve with long dashes plots utility under the Swiss formula; and ¯nally,
utility under the EU compression formula is plotted with short dashes. We
reach the following main result:
Result 1. Reducing the average tari® level increases welfare independent
of the formula used, the initial tari® structure, and the degree of product
di®erentiation.
It is evident from the ¯gure that the strength of the trade liberalization
(Á) and the degree of product di®erentiation (µ) have an impact on the
welfare ranking of the three formulas, while the initial tari® structure
has no in°uence on the qualitative results. Furthermore, as we approach
µ ! 1, the utility ratio becomes 1 in all cases, i.e. trade liberalization has
a neutral welfare impact. This is the case, because as µ ! 1, goods become
close to perfect substitutes, and consumers prefer consumption volume to
consumption variety. Since gains from trade and trade liberalization, in this
4The expression for s and B is found in the separate appendix. The compression
parameter c is given as a speci¯c value in the simulations.
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Figure 2: The ratio of utility before and after liberalization.
model, stem from the wider selection of foreign varieties available, and since
variety does not matter in the limit, the positive e®ect of trade liberalization
fades out. Comparing the Swiss formula to the proportional cut, we obtain:
Result 2. There exists a ^ µ such that for di®erentiated industries, in the
sense that µ < ^ µ, the Swiss formula welfare-dominates the proportional cut,
while for homogeneous industries, in the sense that µ > ^ µ, the proportional
cut welfare-dominates the Swiss formula.
Notice that ^ µ depends on the initial tari® structure and the degree of
liberalization so that a larger cut in the average tari® (larger Á) leads to an
12increase of ^ µ compared to a smaller cut in the average tari®. The ranking of
the EU compression mechanism is more complex:
Result 3.
1. For su±ciently small reductions in the average tari®, the EU com-
pression mechanism welfare-dominates both the Swiss formula and the
proportional cut for di®erentiated industries, in the sense that µ < ^ µ,
while the EU compression mechanism is welfare-dominated by both the
Swiss formula and the proportional cut for homogeneous industries, in
the sense that µ > ^ µ.
2. For su±ciently large reductions in the average tari®, the EU compres-
sion mechanism is welfare-dominated by both the Swiss formula and the
proportional cut for di®erentiated industries, in the sense that µ < ^ µ,
while the EU compression mechanism welfare-dominates both the Swiss
formula and the proportional cut for homogeneous industries, in the
sense that µ > ^ µ.
Notice that Result 3:1 even holds for Á = 0. Thus, even though Á = 0
implies unchanged average tari®s, the application of the compression formula
still has a policy impact. In particular, applying the compression formula
gives a higher utility level for di®erentiated industries, but reduces welfare for
homogeneous industries. In contrast, the proportional cut and Swiss formula
simply replicate the initial utility level. The reason for this is as follows. The
proportional cut and the Swiss formula both reproduce the initial average
tari® level by leaving the low and high tari® unchanged. In contrast, the
compression mechanism obtains the initial average tari® level with altered
low and high tari®s, namely by narrowing the gap between high and low
tari®s. This results in a more equal distribution of tari®s among products,
which in turn generates entry. This creates a welfare gain when goods are
fairly di®erentiated and consumers love variety (low µ) but is welfare-neutral
when goods are more homogeneous (high µ).
The above results give rise to a series of policy implications. Firstly,
reductions in the trade restriction using three di®erent formulas lead to non-
trivial positive impact on welfare. Secondly, from a welfare perspective, dif-
ferent industries should be targeted by di®erent tari® conversion formulas.
For example, when aiming at substantial average tari® cuts in highly di®er-
entiated industries, the Swiss formula is the welfare-superior tool, while when
only minor (even zero) average tari® cuts are implemented for the same type
of industry, a compression mechanism might be superior. Thirdly, no single
formula dominates for all conceivable combinations; on the contrary, for a
13di®erent industry structure, tari® structure, and degree of liberalization, the
dominating formula changes.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines the welfare e®ects of using di®erent tari® reduction
formulas proposed in various GATT/WTO negotiation rounds for achieving
liberalization of trade barriers and improvements in market access. We em-
ploy a simple symmetric two-country general equilibrium model with intra-
industry trade and use numerical simulations to establish welfare results.
We introduce ¯rm-level heterogeneous ¯xed costs of exporting, so that in
this model, not all ¯rms trade in equilibrium; entry, exit and scale decisions
of exporting ¯rms are determined endogenously and depend on the tari®
conversion formula used. Furthermore, we introduce a tari® structure (e.g.
tari® peaks) to allow for high and low tari®s on products. We analyze the
welfare e®ects of applying three di®erent conversion formulas to obtain the
same average tari® cut. The formulas are the proportional cut formula used
in the Kennedy Round; the Swiss formula, which was accepted in the Tokyo
Round; and the EU compression mechanism, which was proposed by the EU
in the Doha Round.
It is established that reduction in the trade restriction using the di®erent
formulas leads to a non-trivial positive impact on welfare. We show that the
degree of trade liberalization and of product di®erentiation have an impact
on the ranking of the three di®erent tari® reduction formulas in terms of
welfare. However, the initial tari® structure { i.e. the initial degree of tari®
dispersion/peaks { has no qualitative in°uence on the results. In particular,
we show that the ranking of the Swiss formula and the proportional cut
depends on the industry structure, so that for di®erentiated industries, the
Swiss formula welfare-dominates the proportional cut, while for homogeneous
industries, the proportional cut welfare-dominates the Swiss formula. This
result holds for all levels of trade liberalization. The ranking of the EU
compression mechanism is more complex, as it depends both on the industry
structure and on the level of trade liberalization. In situations with only small
reductions in trade barriers, the EU compression formula welfare-dominates
(is welfare-dominated by) both the Swiss formula and the proportional cut
for highly di®erentiated industries (homogeneous industries) and vise versa
for large reductions in trade barriers.
These welfare rankings carry important policy implications for the coming
WTO negotiation rounds. Formula approaches have been { and will be { a
central part of WTO negotiations. This paper shows that the welfare e®ects
14of trade liberalization are dependent of the actual tari® reduction formula
used. Di®erent industries should be targeted by di®erent formulas, depending
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